Effectiveness of Modified Vaccinia Ankara-Bavaria Nordic Vaccination in a Population at High Risk of Mpox: A Spanish Cohort Study.

BACKGROUND: With more than 7500 cases reported since April 2022, Spain has experienced the highest incidence of mpox in Europe. From 12 July onward, the modified vaccinia Ankara-Bavaria Nordic (MVA-BN) smallpox vaccine was offered as pre-exposure prophylaxis for those receiving pre-exposure prophylaxis for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV-PrEP). Our aim was to assess the effectiveness of 1 dose of MVA-BN vaccine as pre-exposure prophylaxis against mpox virus (MPXV) infection in persons on HIV-PrEP. METHODS: National retrospective cohort study between 12 July and 12 December 2022. Individuals aged ≥18 years receiving HIV-PrEP as of 12 July with no previous MPXV infection or vaccination were eligible. Each day, we matched individuals receiving a first dose of vaccine and unvaccinated controls of the same age and region. We used a Kaplan-Meier estimator, calculated risk ratios (RR) and vaccine effectiveness (VE = [1 - RR]x100). RESULTS: We included 5660 matched pairs, with a median follow-up of 62 days (interquartile range, 24-97). Mpox cumulative incidence was 5.6 per 1000 (25 cases) in unvaccinated and 3.5 per 1000 (18 cases) in vaccinated. No effect was found during days 0-6 post-vaccination (VE, -38.3; 95% confidence interval [CI], -332.7 to 46.4), but VE was 65% at ≥7 days (95% CI, 22.9 to 88.0) and 79% at ≥14 days (95% CI, 33.3 to 100.0) post-vaccination. CONCLUSIONS: One dose of MVA-BN vaccine offered protection against mpox in most-at-risk population shortly after the vaccination. Further studies need to assess the VE of a second dose and the duration of protection over time.

Post-exposure vaccine effectiveness and contact management in the mpox outbreak, Madrid, Spain, May to August 2022.

BackgroundAppropriate vaccination strategies have been key to controlling the outbreak of mpox outside endemic areas in 2022, yet few studies have provided information on mpox vaccine effectiveness (VE).AimTo assess VE after one dose of a third-generation smallpox vaccine against mpox when given as post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) within 14 days.MethodsA survival analysis in a prospective cohort of close contacts of laboratory-confirmed mpox cases was conducted from the beginning of the outbreak in the region of Madrid in May 2022. The study included contacts of cases in this region diagnosed between 17 May and 15 August 2022. Follow up was up to 49 days. A multivariate proportional hazard model was used to evaluate VE in the presence of confounding and interaction.ResultsInformation was obtained from 484 close contacts, of which 230 were vaccinated within 14 days of exposure. Of the close contacts, 57 became ill during follow-up, eight vaccinated and 49 unvaccinated. The adjusted effectiveness of the vaccine was 88.8% (95% CI: 76.0-94.7). Among sexual contacts, VE was 93.6% (95% CI: 72.1-98.5) for non-cohabitants and 88.6% (95% CI: 66.1-96.2) for cohabitants.ConclusionPost-exposure prophylaxis of close contacts of mpox cases is an effective measure that can contribute to reducing the number of cases and eventually the symptoms of breakthrough infections. The continued use of PEP together with pre-exposure prophylaxis by vaccination and other population-targeted prevention measures are key factors in controlling an mpox outbreak.

Lifting COVID-19 mitigation measures in Spain (May-June 2020).

Introduction: The state of alarm was declared in Spain due to the COVID-19 epidemic on March 14, 2020, and established population confinement measures. The objective is to describe the process of lifting these mitigation measures. Methods: The Plan for the Transition to a New Normality, approved on April 28, contained four sequential phases with progressive increase in socio-economic activities and population mobility. In parallel, a new strategy for early diagnosis, surveillance and control was implemented. A bilateral decision mechanism was established between the Spanish Government and the autonomous communities (AC), guided by a set of qualitative and quantitative indicators capturing the epidemiological situation and core capacities. The territorial units were established ad-hoc and could be from Basic Health Zones to entire AC. Results: The process run from May 4 to June 21, 2020. AC implemented plans for reinforcement of core capacities. Incidence decreased from a median (50% of territories) of 7.4 per 100,000 in 7 days at the beginning to 2.5 at the end. Median PCR testing increased from 53% to 89% of suspected cases and PCR total capacity from 4.5 to 9.8 per 1000 inhabitants weekly; positivity rate decreased from 3.5% to 1.8%. Median proportion of cases with traced contacts increased from 82% to 100%. Conclusion: Systematic data collection, analysis, and interterritorial dialogue allowed adequate process control. The epidemiological situation improved but, mostly, the process entailed a great reinforcement of core response capacities nation-wide, under common criteria. Maintaining and further reinforcing capacities remained crucial for responding to future waves.

Introducción: El 14 de marzo de 2020 España declaró el estado de alarma por la pandemia por COVID-19 incluyendo medidas de confinamiento. El objetivo es describir el proceso de desescalada de estas medidas. Métodos: Un plan de transición hacia una nueva normalidad, del 28 de abril, incluía 4 fases secuenciales incrementando progresivamente las actividades socioeconómicas y la movilidad. Concomitantemente, se implementó una nueva estrategia de diagnóstico precoz, vigilancia y control. Se estableció un mecanismo de decisión bilateral entre Gobierno central y comunidades autónomas (CCAA), guiado por un panel de indicadores cualitativos y cuantitativos de la situación epidemiológica y las capacidades básicas. Las unidades territoriales evaluadas comprendían desde zonas básicas de salud hasta CCAA. Resultados: El proceso se extendió del 4 de mayo al 21 de junio y se asoció a planes de refuerzo de las capacidades en las CCAA. La incidencia disminuyó de una mediana inicial de 7,4 por 100.000 en 7 días a 2,5 al final del proceso. La mediana de pruebas PCR aumentó del 53% al 89% de los casos sospechosos, y la capacidad total de 4,5 a 9,8 pruebas semanales por 1.000 habitantes; la positividad disminuyó del 3,5% al 1,8%. La mediana de casos con contactos trazados aumentó del 82% al 100%. Conclusión: La recogida y análisis sistemático de información y el diálogo interterritorial logaron un adecuado control del proceso. La situación epidemiológica mejoró, pero sobre todo, se aumentaron las capacidades, en todo el país y con criterios comunes, cuyo mantenimiento y refuerzo fue clave en olas sucesivas.

Lifting COVID-19 mitigation measures in Spain (May-June 2020).

INTRODUCTION: The state of alarm was declared in Spain due to the COVID-19 epidemic on March 14, 2020, and established population confinement measures. The objective is to describe the process of lifting these mitigation measures. METHODS: The Plan for the Transition to a New Normality, approved on April 28, contained four sequential phases with progressive increase in socio-economic activities and population mobility. In parallel, a new strategy for early diagnosis, surveillance and control was implemented. A bilateral decision mechanism was established between the Spanish Government and the autonomous communities (AC), guided by a set of qualitative and quantitative indicators capturing the epidemiological situation and core capacities. The territorial units were established ad-hoc and could be from Basic Health Zones to entire AC. RESULTS: The process run from May 4 to June 21, 2020. AC implemented plans for reinforcement of core capacities. Incidence decreased from a median (50% of territories) of 7.4 per 100,000 in 7 days at the beginning to 2.5 at the end. Median PCR testing increased from 53% to 89% of suspected cases and PCR total capacity from 4.5 to 9.8 per 1000 inhabitants weekly; positivity rate decreased from 3.5% to 1.8%. Median proportion of cases with traced contacts increased from 82% to 100%. CONCLUSION: Systematic data collection, analysis, and interterritorial dialogue allowed adequate process control. The epidemiological situation improved but, mostly, the process entailed a great reinforcement of core response capacities nation-wide, under common criteria. Maintaining and further reinforcing capacities remained crucial for responding to future waves.

Lifting COVID-19 mitigation measures in Spain (May–June 2020 / La desescalada de las medidas de mitigación contra el COVID-19 en España (mayo–junio 2020)

Introduction: The state of alarm was declared in Spain due to the COVID-19 epidemic on March 14, 2020, and established population confinement measures. The objective is to describe the process of lifting these mitigation measures. Methods: The Plan for the Transition to a New Normality, approved on April 28, contained four sequential phases with progressive increase in socio-economic activities and population mobility. In parallel, a new strategy for early diagnosis, surveillance and control was implemented. A bilateral decision mechanism was established between the Spanish Government and the autonomous communities (AC), guided by a set of qualitative and quantitative indicators capturing the epidemiological situation and core capacities. The territorial units were established ad-hoc and could be from Basic Health Zones to entire AC. Results: The process run from May 4 to June 21, 2020. AC implemented plans for reinforcement of core capacities. Incidence decreased from a median (50% of territories) of 7.4 per 100,000 in 7 days at the beginning to 2.5 at the end. Median PCR testing increased from 53% to 89% of suspected cases and PCR total capacity from 4.5 to 9.8 per 1000 inhabitants weekly; positivity rate decreased from 3.5% to 1.8%. Median proportion of cases with traced contacts increased from 82% to 100%. Conclusion: Systematic data collection, analysis, and interterritorial dialogue allowed adequate process control. The epidemiological situation improved but, mostly, the process entailed a great reinforcement of core response capacities nation-wide, under common criteria. Maintaining and further reinforcing capacities remained crucial for responding to future waves.(AU)

Introducción: El 14 de marzo de 2020 España declaró el estado de alarma por la pandemia por COVID-19 incluyendo medidas de confinamiento. El objetivo es describir el proceso de desescalada de estas medidas. Métodos: Un plan de transición hacia una nueva normalidad, del 28 de abril, incluía 4 fases secuenciales incrementando progresivamente las actividades socioeconómicas y la movilidad. Concomitantemente, se implementó una nueva estrategia de diagnóstico precoz, vigilancia y control. Se estableció un mecanismo de decisión bilateral entre Gobierno central y comunidades autónomas (CCAA), guiado por un panel de indicadores cualitativos y cuantitativos de la situación epidemiológica y las capacidades básicas. Las unidades territoriales evaluadas comprendían desde zonas básicas de salud hasta CCAA. Resultados: El proceso se extendió del 4 de mayo al 21 de junio y se asoció a planes de refuerzo de las capacidades en las CCAA. La incidencia disminuyó de una mediana inicial de 7,4 por 100.000 en 7 días a 2,5 al final del proceso. La mediana de pruebas PCR aumentó del 53% al 89% de los casos sospechosos, y la capacidad total de 4,5 a 9,8 pruebas semanales por 1.000 habitantes; la positividad disminuyó del 3,5% al 1,8%. La mediana de casos con contactos trazados aumentó del 82% al 100%. Conclusión: La recogida y análisis sistemático de información y el diálogo interterritorial logaron un adecuado control del proceso. La situación epidemiológica mejoró, pero sobre todo, se aumentaron las capacidades, en todo el país y con criterios comunes, cuyo mantenimiento y refuerzo fue clave en olas sucesivas.(AU)

24 de marzo. Hacia el fin de la tuberculosis sin dejar a nadie atrás / No disponible

No disponible

Actividades de vigilancia epidemiológica durante la pandemia de gripe (H1N1) 2009 en España. Reflexiones un años después / Epidemiological surveillance activities during the 2009 influenza pandemic in Spain. Lessons learnt one year after

En este artículo se revisan las actuaciones llevadas a cabo en España en materia de vigilancia epidemiológica durante la pandemia de gripe y las recomendaciones de ellas derivadas en los diferentes momentos de la evolución de la misma. El funcionamiento del Sub-comité de Vigilancia, contemplado en el Plan Nacional de Prepara-ción y Respuesta ante una pandemia de gripe, fue clave para la coor-dinación de estas actividades de vigilancia. Este Subcomité se activó de forma inmediata tras la declaración de la alerta y su papel también se describe en este trabajo. La existencia del Plan permitió una respuesta rápida y coordina-da tras la declaración de la alerta. La vigilancia epidemiológica y virológica de la gripe hubo de ir adaptándose a una situación cam-biante, y se pusieron en marcha sistemas adicionales a los de la vigi-lancia habitual de la gripe, tales como la vigilancia individualizada de casos en la comunidad y de casos graves y mortales. Entre las lecciones aprendidas destacan la necesidad de fortale-cer el análisis de los datos que se recogen durante una alerta, la nece-sidad de favorecer el intercambio de información entre los profesio-nales de salud pública y los asistenciales, y de reforzar la capacidad de respuesta para poder disponer de estructuras de salud pública fuertes y consolidadas ante futuras alertas sanitarias(AU)

In this article the actions taken in the area of epidemiological sur-veillance in Spain during the influenza pandemic and the recommen-dations drawn from them during the progression of the pandemic are reviewed. The performance of the Surveillance Subcommittee established in the National Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan was cen-tral to the coordination of these activities. The Surveillance Subcom-mittee was immediately activated when the alert was issued. Its role is also described in this review. The existence of a National Plan allowed a rapid and coordinated response after the alert declaration. The epidemiological and virolo-gical surveillance of the influenza pandemic was adapted to an evol-ving situation. In addition to routine influenza monitoring systems, new surveillance systems were put in place such as a case-based sur-veillance for community influenza cases and a case-based survei-llance for severe cases and deaths due to the pandemic. Among the lessons learned from this pandemic, we would high-light the need to strengthen the timely analysis of data collected during an alert, the need to promote the exchange of information among public health and health care professionals, and to strengthen the response capacity in order to have resilient and consolidated public health structures for future health alerts(AU)

[Epidemiological surveillance activities during the 2009 influenza pandemic in Spain: lessons learnt one year after]. / Actividades de vigilancia epidemiológica durante la pandemia de gripe (H1N1) 2009 en España: Reflexiones un año después.

In this article the actions taken in the area of epidemiological surveillance in Spain during the influenza pandemic and the recommendations drawn from them during the progression of the pandemic are reviewed. The performance of the Surveillance Subcommittee established in the National Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan was central to the coordination of these activities. The Surveillance Subcommittee was immediately activated when the alert was issued. Its role is also described in this review. The existence of a National Plan allowed a rapid and coordinated response after the alert declaration. The epidemiological and virological surveillance of the influenza pandemic was adapted to an evolving situation. In addition to routine influenza monitoring systems, new surveillance systems were put in place such as a case-based surveillance for community influenza cases and a case-based surveillance for severe cases and deaths due to the pandemic. Among the lessons learned from this pandemic, we would highlight the need to strengthen the timely analysis of data collected during an alert, the need to promote the exchange of information among public health and health care professionals, and to strengthen the response capacity in order to have resilient and consolidated public health structures for future health alerts.